Georgia Supreme Court upholds "floor" amount of child support
On July 6, 2006, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed a Cherokee County Superior Court judge in Jones v. Jones, S06A0388. Presiding Justice Carol W. Hunstein wrote for the majority; Justices Benham and Hines dissented. From the Court's summary:
The Court found that a settlement agreement entered into by the parties was incorporated into their final decree of divorce. One provision of the agreement “provid[ed] for waiver of downward modification of alimony in the form of child support below a pre-determined ‘floor amount.’" Appellee sought a modification of his child support payments after a drop in his income and the trial court granted a reduction, having “determin[ed] that ‘a special circumstance of the requirements of justice and fairness necessitate a modification’ of its prior order and declared ‘void’ the floor amount provision in the settlement agreement.”
In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court has ruled that a review of the record “establishes that there is no evidence of the ‘special circumstance of the requirements of justice and fairness’ referenced by the trial court to support its decision to deem void the waiver in the parties' settlement agreement of downward modification below a pre-determined ‘floor amount’ of alimony in the form of child support,” and that as a result “the trial court erred by relieving appellee of his obligations imposed by the settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree.”
In his dissenting opinion, Justice P. Harris Hines argues that by the terms of the settlement agreement the parties agreed to “waive their statutory right to future modifications, up or down, of the alimony payments provided for herein . . .." (Emphasis supplied.). However, “‘child support’ is not mentioned in the provision, only ‘alimony.’" As a result, Justice Hines would affirm the trial court’s “determin[ation] that the provision does not operate to waive Mr. Jones’s right to seek a downward modification of child support.” Justice Robert Benham joined in the dissent.
The Court found that a settlement agreement entered into by the parties was incorporated into their final decree of divorce. One provision of the agreement “provid[ed] for waiver of downward modification of alimony in the form of child support below a pre-determined ‘floor amount.’" Appellee sought a modification of his child support payments after a drop in his income and the trial court granted a reduction, having “determin[ed] that ‘a special circumstance of the requirements of justice and fairness necessitate a modification’ of its prior order and declared ‘void’ the floor amount provision in the settlement agreement.”
In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court has ruled that a review of the record “establishes that there is no evidence of the ‘special circumstance of the requirements of justice and fairness’ referenced by the trial court to support its decision to deem void the waiver in the parties' settlement agreement of downward modification below a pre-determined ‘floor amount’ of alimony in the form of child support,” and that as a result “the trial court erred by relieving appellee of his obligations imposed by the settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree.”
In his dissenting opinion, Justice P. Harris Hines argues that by the terms of the settlement agreement the parties agreed to “waive their statutory right to future modifications, up or down, of the alimony payments provided for herein . . .." (Emphasis supplied.). However, “‘child support’ is not mentioned in the provision, only ‘alimony.’" As a result, Justice Hines would affirm the trial court’s “determin[ation] that the provision does not operate to waive Mr. Jones’s right to seek a downward modification of child support.” Justice Robert Benham joined in the dissent.
posted by Steve Worrall @ 3:35 PM
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